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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
v . 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case No. 870407-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal i s from a c o n v i c t i o n of Tampering w i t h 
W i t n e s s , a C l a s s A Misdemeanor f in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. 
S 7 6 - 8 - 5 0 8 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , and O f f i c i a l Misconduct , a C l a s s B 
Misdemeanor, in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 8 - 2 0 1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 
a f t e r a t r i a l in the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court . This Court 
has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 2 a -
3(2) (e) ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1 . Whether p r e j u d i c i a l error occurred p r i o r t o t r i a l ? 
A. Whether Count I of the Indictment was 
s u f f i c i e n t on i t s face? 
B. Whether defendant was e n t i t l e d be a preliminary 
hearing on the grand jury indictment? 
C. Whether the t r i a l court properly denied 
defendant's Motion for a B i l l of Part iculars? 
D. Whether the t r i a l court properly admitted the 
co -consp ira tor ' s statements as non-hearsay 
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E)? 
2. Whether prejudicial error occurred during trial? 
A. Whether the trial court properly admitted 
defendant's grand jury testimony as 
constitutionally obtained? 
B. Whether the record establishes that Exhibits 
30, 31 and 32 were admitted into evidence? 
C. Whether this Court should consider the issue 
regarding the trial court's exclusion of 
hearsay statements in light of defendant's 
failure to support his claim of error with any 
record evidence, legal analysis, or authority? 
D. Whether defendant failed to preserve for review 
the issue regarding the constitutionality of 
the Tampering with Witness statute, and whether 
Jury Instruction 39 relieved the State of its 
burden of proof? 
3. Whether prosecutorial misconduct, if any, was 
harmless? 
A* Whether defendant fails to support his claim 
that he was singled out among grand jury 
"target" witnesses to be denied notice and 
right to counsel. 
B. Whether the prosecutor ' s a l leged concealment of 
exculpatory evidence was harmless? 
C. Whether t h i s Court should consider defendant's 
claim that the prosecutor attempted to prevent 
defense wi tnes ses from t e s t i f y i n g where 
defendant r e l i e s on matters outs ide the record? 
D. Whether the prosecutor ' s comment regarding 
defendant's prospect ive r ight to t e s t i f y was 
harmless s ince defendant did t e s t i f y at t r i a l ? 
E. Whether prosecutor ia l misconduct requiring 
reversal occurred at t r i a l ? 
1. Whether defendant f a i l s to show prejudice 
in l i g h t of the admission at t r i a l of the 
a l leged non-disc losed exculpatory evidence? 
2 . Whether defendant f a i l s to support h i s 
claim of cumulative misconduct with l e g a l 
a n a l y s i s or authority? 
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4. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
Motion to Arrest Judgment? 
5. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support 
defendant's convictions? 
6. Whether cummulative error exists? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ralph Tolman, was charged by Indictment with 
Criminal Conspiracy, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1978), Tampering with Evidence, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1978), 
Tampering with Witness, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-508 (1978), and Official Misconduct, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 
(1978) . 
Defendant was convicted of Tampering with a Witness a 
Class "A" Misdemeanor, and Official Misconduct, a class "B" 
Misdemeanor, in a jury trial held February 18, 1987 through March 
6, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, 
presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Uno on May 5, 1987 
to perform 600 hours of community service in lieu of jail, to pay 
a fine of $2,500, and to remain on court supervised probation for 
a period of 18 months (R. 501-02)• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 1, 1983, a fire occurred at the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza in Murray, Utah (R. 540 at p. 272). The 
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damages caused by the fire were in excess of one million dollars 
including damages to the office of Dr. Joe Culbertson, a Salt 
Lake County employee in the Mental Health Department (R. 540 at 
pp. 274, 286, and 359). After the fire had been extinguished, C. 
Dean Larsen, Assistant Chief and Fire Marshall for the Murray 
City Fire Department, reported that in his opinion the fire 
originated in the office of Dr. Culbertson due to the misuse of 
an extension cord and space heater (R. 540 at pp. 268, and 285-
86) . 
The next day, Evan Stephens, the Risk Manager for Salt 
Lake County, requested Bill Hyde, Chief Deputy of the Civil 
Division for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, to begin an 
investigation into the cause and origin of the fire due to the 
possible liability facing the County (R. 540 at pp. 346, and 363; 
R. 541 at p. 499)• In response, a request for investigative 
assistance was sent to Claude Donald Harman, the Chief 
Investigator for the County Attorney's Office (R. 529 at pp. 116 
and 126) . Harman assigned defendant and investigator Olin Yearby 
to assist Murray City Fire Department in determining the cause 
and origin of the fire (R. 532 at p. 1233)• 
On Monday, May 2, 1985, defendant and Yearby went to 
the fire scene and assisted Chief Larsen in performing a "dig-
down" in Culbertson's office (R. 532 at p. 1233). Larsen 
explained to defendant his theory that the space heater in 
Culbertson's office was the cause of the fire. id.. 
On May 3, 1988, defendant informed Mr. Stephens that he 
concurred with Mr. Larsen's opinion that the fire originated in 
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the County offices (R. 532 at p. 1236)• Concerned about the 
County's liability, Mr. Stephens obtained authorization to hire 
Jim Ashby, a private fire investigator, to determine the cause 
and origin of the fire (R. 541 at p. 384-85). Mr. Stephens wrote 
Harman a letter on May 5, 1983 thanking him for the investigative 
assistance, explaining the County's exposure to substantial 
liability, and notifying him that an outside fire expert had been 
retained, id.. (State's Exhibit 12.) 
Subsequently, the space heater cord was examined by an 
independent laboratory which determined that the heater could not 
have been the cause of the fire since it was not energized at the 
time of the fire (R. 532 at p. 659). Based upon the laboratory 
results and his independent investigation, Mr. Ashby filed a 
cause and origin report on June 6, 1983 concluding that the fire 
originated in the attic above the county offices (R. 536 at pp. 
659-662) (State's Exhibit 18). 
On June 21, 1983, defendant prepared a case closure 
form which was rejected by his immediate supervisor, Sam Dawson, 
because it lacked a report on the fire (R. 532 at p. 124) 
(State's Exhibit 22). On August 1, 1983, defendant submitted a 
seven-page report to Mr. Dawson who refused to accept it stating 
that it "parroted" Larsen's fire report, it did not state the 
sources relied upon, and it made the County look bad (R. 532 at 
p. 1244) (State's Exhibit 8) (£££ Appendix "A"). At defendant's 
insistence, Dawson passed the report on to Harman for review (R. 
532 at p. 1245). Several days later, Harman called defendant 
into his office regarding the report. Id. Harman informed 
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Tolman that his report was unacceptable, that it "parroted" 
Larsen's report, that it made the County look bad, and ordered 
defendant to prepare a more concise report which referred to 
Ashby's favorable report (R. 535 at 869; R. 541 at pp. 444, 509 
and 561; R. 536 at pp. 665, 696, 702 and 748; R. 530 at pp. 14-16 
and 44; R. 532 at 1246). Harman further ordered defendant to 
shit can, destroy, deep six, shred, get rid of, and tear up the 
seven page report and submit a one-page, short report which did 
not identify the origin and source of the fire (R. 530 at p. 16; 
R. 535 at pp. 919 and 940; R. 530 at pp. 19 and 29; R. 530 at p. 
16; R. 535 at p. 869; R. 536 at p. 747; R. 535 at p. 924; R. 530 
at p. 15) • 
Soon thereafter, defendant telephoned Larsen and told 
him that Harman was angry about the content of the report, was 
concerned that it could cost the county millions of dollars, and 
wanted the report destroyed (R. 535 at p. 91, R. 532 at p. 1256). 
Defendant had given Larsen a courtesy copy of the report prior to 
Harmanfs rejection of the report (R. 532 at p. 1255-56). 
Defendant told Larsen to "destroy," "get rid of," "paper the 
walls with," "eat," and "deep six," the report. i&. Defendant 
explained that Harman believed defendant and Larsen to be too 
close of friends and that defendant wrote the report to bolster 
Larsen's theory of the fire (R. 535 at p. 919). 
On August 25, 1983, defendant submitted a one-page 
report excluding any opinions as to the fire origin and simply 
referring to Ashby's report (State's Exhibit 7) (See Appendix 
"B"). The report was quickly approved, signed by Harman, and 
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placed in the County Attorney1s master file thus closing the case 
(R. 536 at pp. 752-53). 
In November, 1985, Larsen revealed the existence of the 
seven-page report during a civil deposition inquiring into the 
cause of the fire (R. 535 at pp. 932 and 938). Larsen testified 
at the deposition that Harman had ordered defendant to destroy 
the report (R. 535 at p. 940) • Soon after, the media reported 
that a cover-up existed in the County Attorney's Office regarding 
the investigative report (R. 530 at p. 9) • 
In 1986, a Salt Lake County Grand Jury was called to 
investigate possible criminal charges related to the alleged 
cover-up of reports regarding the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza fire (R. 537 at p. 1020). The Grand Jury subsequently 
indicted defendant and Harman for Criminal Conspiracy, Tampering 
with a Witness, Tampering with Evidence, and Official Misconduct 
(R. 195-99). After a jury trial held February 18, 1987 through 
March 6, 1987, defendant was convicted of Tampering with a 
Witness and Official Misconduct (R. 501-02). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Count I of the Indictment was facially sufficient to 
set forth the essential elements of the offense of Conspiracy. 
In any event, any alleged insufficiency was harmless since 
defendant was not convicted of Conspiracy. Defendant was not 
constitutionally entitled to a preliminary hearing on the grand 
jury indictment. Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars 
improperly sought to discover State's evidence and limit the 
State1s avenue of proof. The trial court properly found that the 
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prosecution had established a criminal conspiracy thus admitting 
the co-conspirator's non-hearsay statements pursuant to Rule 
801(d)(2)(E). 
The defendants grand jury testimony was 
constitutionally admissible since defendant was properly notified 
of his "target- status, his right against self-incrimination, his 
right to counsel, the subject matter of the investigation, and 
the anticipated prospective charges, all prior to his grand jury 
testimony. Thus, defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination and right 
to counsel before the grand jury. The record establishes that 
State's Exhibits 30, 31 and 32 were admitted into evidence. 
Because defendant fails to support his claim that the trial court 
erred in not admitting defense witness hearsay testimony, this 
Court should not consider defendant's claim. Defendant cannot 
raise the constitutionality of the Tampering with Witness statute 
for the first time on appeal. Jury Instruction Number 39 
requisitely related defendant's act of tampering to an official 
investigation or proceeding. 
Because defendant fails to support his claim that he 
was singled out among grand jury witnesses to be denied notice 
and right to counsel, this Court should not consider defendant's 
claim. The alleged non-disclosed exculpatory witnesses testified 
on defendants behalf at trial and thus any alleged non-
disclosure was harmless. In the absence of record evidence, this 
Court should not consider defendant's assertion that the 
prosecution attempted to prevent defense witnesses from 
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testifying. Since defendant testified at trial, the prosecutor's 
statement regarding defendant's prospective right to testify was 
rendered harmless. Defendant merely speculates that there may be 
additional non-disclosed exculpatory evidence and therefore his 
speculative claim cannot be reversible error. Again, because 
defendant fails to support his argument with record evidence, 
legal authority, or legal analysis, defendant's claim of 
cumulative error should not be entertained. 
Defendant's attempt to impeach the verdict was improper 
where defendant erroneously claimed that the jury was exposed to 
an improper "outside influence," namely, God. Rule 606(b) 
precludes a defendant's attempt to establish by affidavit or 
testimony that a juror was affected by his or her religious 
convictions. Since defendant fails to support with record 
evidence whether a dictionary was used in the jury room or how it 
was used, this Court should assume the correctness of the 
verdict. 
The evidence was sufficient to establish the requisite 
elements of the offenses of Tampering with Witness and Official 
Misconduct. 
Defendant is not entitled to reversal of his 
convictions on the basis of either individually prejudicial or 
cumulative error. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED PRIOR TO 
TRIAL 
A. COUNT I OF THE INDICTMENT WAS SUFFICIENT 
ON ITS FACE, 
On appeal, defendant reasserts his position at trial 
that Count I of the Indictment was facially deficient (R. 62). 
Specifically, defendant claims that Count I did not allege how 
the co-defendant's had a unity of design to conspire. 
Defendant's claim should be rejected. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets 
forth the requirements of a charging document as follows: 
(b) An indictment or information shall 
charge the offense for which the defendant is 
being prosecuted by using the name given to 
the offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating in concise terras the definition of 
the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. As information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause 
to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as time, place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership 
need not be alleged unless necessary to 
charge the offense. • • • 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(b) (1982). 
Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(b), an indictment which 
charges a criminal offense by using the statutory definition 
setting forth the elements of the offense is sufficient on its 
face if it gives the defendant notice of the charge. However, 
due process may require that an accused be given sufficiently 
precise notification of the date of the alleged crime so that he 
can prepare his defense. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 772-73 
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(Utah 1 9 8 5 ) ; S t a t e Vt Ea irby , 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ; McNair 
Vt PaVWflrdf 666 P.2d 3 2 1 , 326 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) ; S t a t e v . Bundy, 684 
P.2d 58f 61 (Utah 1984). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1978) defines the offense of 
criminal conspiracy as follows: 
For purposes of this part a person is 
guilty of conspiracy when hef intending that 
conduct constituting a crime be performed, 
agrees with one or more persons to engage in 
or cause the performance of such conduct and 
any one of them commits an overt act in 
pursuance of the conspiracy, except where the 
offense is a capital offense, a felony 
against the person, arson, burglary, or 
robbery, the overt act is not required for 
the commission of conspiracy. 
Further, the offense of tampering with evidence is 
defined as follows: 
A person commits a felony of the second 
degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals or removes 
anything with a purpose to impair its verity 
of availability in the proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything 
which he knows to be false with a purpose to 
deceive a public servant who is or may be 
engaged in a proceeding or investigation. 
When an overt act is necessary to constitute the 
offense of conspiracy, Utah Code Ann. S 77-17-4 (1982) requires 
that the indictment expressly allege an overt act: 
On a trial for conspiracy in a case where 
an overt act is necessary to constitute the 
offense, the defendant shall not be convicted 
unless one or more overt acts are expressly 
alleged in the information or indictment, and 
unless one of the acts alleged has been 
proved. However, proof of overt acts not 
alleged may be given in evidence. 
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Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-4 (1982). 
In the present case, Count I of the Indictment charged 
as follows: 
COUNT I 
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, CONSPIRACY TO TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE) 
Beginning from on or about August 1, 1983 
through on or about August 31, 1983, in Salt 
Lake County, intending that conduct 
constituting a crime be performed, and 
believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending or about to be 
instituted, defendants Claude Donald Harman 
and Ralph Tolman, then investigators of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 
conspired, combined, confederated and agreed 
with each other to alter, destroy, conceal or 
remove a report, with a purpose to impair the 
report's verity or availability in the 
proceeding or investigation, or to make, 
present or use a report, which defendants 
knew to be false, with a purpose to deceive a 
public servant or servants who were or may 
have been engaged in an official proceeding 
or investigation, said reports having been 
prepared by defendant Tolman regarding the 
origin of a fire that occurred on or about 
May 1, 1983 at the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza, Salt Lake County, that involved the 
destruction of County and private property. 
In furtherance, of the conspiracy and to 
effect the objects thereof, the following 
overt acts were committed: 
(a) On or about August 1, 1983, 
defendant Harman, the then Chief 
Investigator of the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, rejected defendant 
Tolman's August 1, 1983, seven-page report 
about the origin of the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza fire; 
(b) On or about August 1, 1983, 
defendant Harman issued instructions to 
defendant Tolman to write a brief or one-
page report closing his investigation into 
the origin of the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza fire; 
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(c) On or about August 25, 1983, 
defendant Tolman submitted to defendant 
Harman a one-page report which eliminated 
any reference to defendant Tolman1s 
opinion as to the origin of the fire; 
(d) On or about August 25, 1983, 
defendant Harman accepted and approved 
defendant Tolman's report of August 25, 
1983 as defendant Tolman1s official report 
regarding his investigation of the Fashion 
Place Professional Plaza fire; all in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-201, a 
felony of the Third Degree. 
(R. 195-97). 
As shown above, Count I of the Indictment precisely 
sets forth the statutory definition of the crime of conspiracy 
along with a detailed statement of facts which describes the 
alleged date of the crime, the evidence alleged to have been 
tampered with, and the conduct of the co-defendant's in mutually 
altering the content of the evidence. No additional factual 
information was necessary to set forth the essential elements of 
the offense. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Miller, 677 P.2d 
1129, 1132 (Utah 1984) discussed the requirements of alleging an 
overt act in a conspiracy case and noted as follows: 
[I]f [the conspirators enter] 
into [an] agreement then the 
crime of conspiracy [is] complete 
when, in addition thereto, they, 
or either of them, [do] any act 
"to effect the object- of the 
agreement, even though that act 
did not itself effect the object 
of the agreement. 
State v, Erwirw 101 Utah 365, 383, 120 p.2d 
285, 295 (1941). If the overt act is done to 
effect the object of the conspiracy, it does 
not matter how remote the act may be from 
accomplishing its object. "The function of 
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the overt act in a conspiracy prosecution is 
simply to manifest 'that the conspiracy is at 
work,' and is neither a project still resting 
solely in the minds of the conspirators nor a 
fully completed operation no longer in 
existence.- Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 
298, 334, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1084, 1 L.Ed.2d 
1356 (1957). 
State v. Miller. 672 P.2d at 1132 (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted) . 
In the present case, the conspiracy charge alleges that 
defendant, at the request of Harraan, wrote a brief, one-page 
report regarding the Fashion Place fire in an attempt to alter or 
conceal the damaging seven-page report (R. 195-199). The alleged 
overt act of defendant was clearly the writing of the substitute 
report. Therefore, the Conspiracy charge was facially 
sufficient. 
In any event, the alleged error, if any, was harmless 
since defendant was not convicted of criminal conspiracy. The 
co-conspirator's hearsay statements were admissible based upon 
the trial court's finding that a preponderance of evidence 
established that a conspiracy existed between defendant and 
Harman. The charging of the offense of conspiracy is not a pre-
requisite to the admission of co-conspirator's statements. See 
Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Thus, no likelihood of a different 
result exists. 
B. JUDGE DANIELS PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
Defendant asserts that he was denied his right to a 
preliminary hearing under Article 1, Section 13 of the Utah 
Constitution. Defendant misreads the constiutitonal provision. 
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As stated earlier, the offenses charged against 
defendant were brought by grand jury indictment (R. 195-99). 
Article 1, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
[Prosecution by information or indictment— 
Grand Jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted 
by information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the 
consent of the State, or by indictment, with 
or without such examination and commitment. 
The formation of the grand jury and the 
powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
As is clearly seen, the constitutional provision treats 
a prosecution by indictment differently than a prosecution by 
information. A preliminary examination is not required in a 
prosecution by indictment and the provision does not prohibit 
prosecution by indictment without a preliminary examination. The 
provision does require a preliminary examination in prosecutions 
by information, but simply provides that a prosecution by 
indictment may be "with or without*! such an examination. 
Defendant's interpretation simply ignores the separate treatment 
of the two methods of prosecution. 
The provision further requires that the legislature set 
forth the duties and powers of the grand jury. Accordingly, Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7(c) provides that "a 
preliminary examination shall not be held if the defendant is 
indicted.- Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-7(c) (1982). It is well 
established that a legislative provision which is not clearly and 
expressly prohibited by or clearly in conflict with a provision 
of the Constitution is constitutional. Trade Commission v. 
-15-
Skaggs Drug Centers Inc.. 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (Utah 
1968); Matheson v. Ferrv, 641 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982); Allen Vt 
Rampten, 463 P.2d 7 (Utah 1969); Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 
1010 (Utah 1974). The legislative language of Rule 7(c) not 
being in conflict with Article I, Section 13, Judge Daniels 
properly ruled that defendant was not entitled to a preliminary 
hearing. 
C. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars. He claims that further 
factual information was necessary to prepare his defense and that 
the trial court erred in failing to compel the prosecution to 
limit or circumscribe the area, field, or transaction to which 
evidence could be offered. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b) requires that an offense be 
charged as follows: 
An indictment or information shall charge 
the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the 
offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating is concise terras the definitions of 
the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. As information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause 
to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as time, place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership 
need not be alleged unless necessary to 
charge the offense. Such things as money, 
securities, written instruments, pictures, 
statutes and judgments may be described by 
any name or description by which they are 
generally known or by which they may be 
identified without setting forth a copy. 
However, details concerning such things may 
be obtained through a bill of particulars. 
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Neither presumptions of law nor matters of 
judicial notice need be stated, 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(b) (1982). Additionally, Rule 4(e) 
provides for a Bill of Particulars under the following 
circumstances: 
When facts not set out in an information 
or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the 
offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a 
written motion for a bill of particulars. 
The motion shall be filed at arraignment or 
within ten days thereafter, or at such later 
time as the court may permit. The court may, 
on its own motion, direct the filing of a 
bill of particulars. A bill of particulars 
may be amended or supplemented at any time 
subject to such conditions as justice may 
require. The request for and contents of a 
bill of particulars shall be limited to a 
statement of factual information needed to 
set forth the essential elements of the 
particular offense charged. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(e) (1982). 
In the present case, the offenses of Tampering with a 
Witness and Official Misconduct were set forth in Count IV and 
Count V of the Indictment as follows: 
COUNT IV 
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS—RALPH TOLMAN) 
During the month of August 1983, in S a l t 
Lake County, be l i ev ing that an o f f i c i a l 
proceeding or i n v e s t i g a t i o n was pending or 
about to be i n s t i t u t e d , defendant Ralph 
Tolraan did attempt to induce or otherwise 
cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold testimony, 
information, document, or thing, in that 
defendant Tolman requested C. Dean Larsen to 
destroy or dispose of defendant Tolmanfs 
seven-page i n v e s t i g a t i v e report of August 1 , 
1983, regarding the May 1 , 1983, Fashion 
Place Profess ional Plaza f i r e ; a l l in 
v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 , a 
fe lony of the Third Degree. 
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COUNT V 
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT—UNAUTHORIZED ACTS OR FAILURE OF DUTY) 
During the month of August, 1983, in Salt 
Lake County, defendants Ralph Tolman and 
Claude Donald Harman, then investigators for 
the Salt Lake County Attorney^ Office and 
public servants, with the intent to benefit 
themselves or another, or to harm another, 
knowingly committed unauthorized acts which 
purported to be acts of their office, or 
knowingly refrained from performing a duty 
imposed upon them by law or clearly inherent 
in the nature of their office, in that said 
defendants altered, destroyed, concealed or 
removed Ralph Tolmanfs seven-page 
investigative report of August 1, 1983, 
regarding the May 1, 1983, Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza fire, with the purpose to 
impair its verity or availability in an 
official proceeding or investigation which 
was pending or about to be instituted; all in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201, a 
Class B Misdemeanor (R. 198-99). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a Motion for a Bill of 
Particulars requesting the prosecution to state with regards to 
Count IV: (1) the specific acts alleged to have been committed 
by defendant Tolman to induce or cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold 
testimony information documents or things; (2) which element of 
testimony, information, document or thing was alleged to have 
been the subject of such inducement or cause beside the seven-
page report; (3) whether said report was in fact withheld by C. 
Dean Larsen; (4) the date, time, location and general nature of 
acts alleged; (5) the nature of the official proceeding or 
investigation which was pending or about to be instituted; and 
(6) the specific basis for alleging that defendant Tolman 
believed that such proceeding or investigation as described above 
was pending or about to be instituted (R. 65-66). With regards 
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to Count V, defendant requested: (1) the specif ic nature of the 
benefi t or harm intended by defendant Tolraan; (2) the specif ic 
ac t s which defendant Tolman performed or fa i led to perform; (3) 
the speci f ic basis upon which i t i s alleged tha t the ac ts or 
omissions performed by defendant Tolman were knowingly performed 
(R. 65-66). After a motion hearing on the matter and upon 
considerat ion of accompanying memorandums, the t r i a l court denied 
defendant 's Motion for a B i l l of Pa r t i cu la r s (R. 159-60). 
Upon analys is of the substance of defendant 's motion, 
defendant 's request was improper. The Utah Supreme Court has 
s ta ted tha t the purpose of a B i l l of Pa r t i cu l a r s i s to provide to 
the accused whatever information the prosecution has tha t may fix 
the da te , time, and place of the alleged offense. State v. 
Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). However, the Court has 
c lea r ly s ta ted tha t a b i l l of p a r t i c u l a r s need not plead matters 
of evidence, nor i s i t to be used as a device to enable 
defendants to obtain a review of the prosecut ion ' s evidence. 1£. 
a t 773; State v. Mitchel l , 571 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Utah 1977); State 
v. Moraine. 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831, 833 (1970); S ta te v. 
Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 875-76 (1964); State v. 
Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852, 855 (1950); S ta te v. Jameson, 
103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173, 175 (1943). 
In the present case , defendant sought discovery of the 
theory and evidence which the prosecution intended to use in 
proving the charged offenses. Clear ly , defendant cannot attempt 
to •freeze" the S t a t e ' s case in advance of t r i a l by precluding 
the S ta te from u t i l i z i n g evidence tha t may develop a t t r i a l . 
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D e f e n d a n t s request was not to c l a r i f y a vague element of the 
crime, but rather* an e f f o r t to discover the S t a t e ' s evidence and 
l i m i t the S t a t e ' s a l t e r n a t i v e avenues of proof. {See State v. 
£aHL2Hf 736 P.2d 1059, 1063-1064 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J . , 
d i s s e n t i n g ) ; S ta te v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1985) . Thus, 
defendant's Motion for B i l l of Par t i cu lars was improper and 
cannot be grounds for error. 
In any event , the S t a t e ' s refusal to respond to 
defendant's Motion for a B i l l of Part i cu lars was harmless. The 
Utah Supreme Court has explained that an error i s harmless where 
there i s no subs tant ia l l i k e l i h o o d of a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t in the 
absence of the error. See State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 637 
(Utah 1982) . As shown above, the e s s e n t i a l elements of the 
charged o f f enses and the f a c t s in support thereof were c l e a r l y 
and s p e c i f i c a l l y s e t forth in the Indictment as required by Rule 
4(b) (R. 1 9 8 - 9 9 ) . No further information was necessary to inform 
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged. 
Notably, defendant f a i l s to a l l e g e in h i s brief what 
s p e c i f i c information was necessary to h i s defense and how the 
lack of the s p e c i f i c information prejudiced h i s defense . 
Addi t iona l ly , defendant was provided copies of a l l grand jury 
t r a n s c r i p t s regarding the charged offense (R. 116-19) . In the 
absence of a showing of any prejudice , the t r i a l count 's denial 
of defendant 's motion was harmless error at most. 
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D. THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE NON-HEARSAY 
CO-CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE 
801(d)(2)(E). 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding 
that a conspiracy existed and that defendant was a party to that 
conspiracy thus making admissible the non-hearsay co-
conspirator's statements. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Statements which are not hearsay. 
A statement is not hearsay if 
The statement is offered against a party and 
is . . . a statement by a co-conspirator of 
a party during the course and in the 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard to be applied to 
co-conspirator's statements in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986) and noted as follows: 
We acknowledge the divergent authority on 
the subject and hold today, in accordance 
with the prevailing view, that the criminal 
venture and the defendant's participation 
therein must be established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. When applying the 
standard to determine whether to admit a co-
conspirator's hearsay statements, the court 
may consider the accused's own statements 
indicating his involvement in the conspiracy, 
as well as actions by the accused or the 
declarant. . . . 
Id. at 1319, (footnotes omitted). 
In the present case, the trial court permitted the 
prosecution to establish independently the criminal venture and 
defendant's participation therein prior to the admission of the 
co-conspirator's statements. At the time of the ruling, the 
State had established that defendant had prepared a seven-page 
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repor t concluding tha t the f i r e originated in the County of f ices , 
tha t Harman had rejected the repor t s t a t i ng i t made the County 
look l i a b l e , tha t Harman ordered defendant to prepare a shor t , 
one-page repor t re fe r r ing to Ashby's repor t which concludes the 
f i re or iginated elsewhere, tha t defendant submitted the one-page 
repor t as ordered dele t ing h is inves t iga t ive f indings , and tha t 
Harman approved the one-page repor t (R. 536 at pp. 696 and 747) 
(State's Exhibits 7 and 8). 
Based upon the independent evidence, the trial court 
found as follows: 
Based on testimony that has been given so 
far, the Court is of the opinion that the 
evidence does show that there is some, either 
whether you call it cover-up or some evidence 
that would indicate that there is, on the 
part of the parties involved, an effort to 
not have the report that is the subject 
matter of this particular hearing not to be 
divulged publicly as far as the records of 
the county attorney is concerned. 
(R. 535 at p. 868) . 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Gray. an appellate 
court "will not disturb the ruling of the trial court on 
questions of admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears 
that the lower court was in error." Gray, at 1316; See also, 
State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983). The trial court 
made its finding that the evidence established a cover-up by the 
parties to conceal the investigative report. Thus, the non-
hearsay co-conspirator statements were properly admitted. 
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by 
failing to hold a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the 
co-conspirator statements pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (R. 
29-30). Rule 104(a) provides as follows: 
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Questions of admissibility generally. 
Preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be witness, 
the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined 
by the court, subject to the provisions of 
subdivision (b). In making its determination 
it is not bound by the rules of evidence 
except those with respect to privileges. 
Utah R. Evid. 104(a). Plainly, Rule 104(a) does not require a 
pretrial determination of admissibility, but rather, that the 
determination be made preliminary. This view is in accord with 
the Supreme Court's ruling in Gray which would permit a 
conspirator's statements to be provisionally admitted subject to 
eventual independent proof and a finding of admissibility before 
the case is submitted to the jury. Gr^y at 1319. (See jal££, 
Bouriaily v. United States, 483 U.S. , 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 107 S. 
Ct. 2775 (June 23, 1987); United States Vt JflCkSPnr 757 F.2d 1486 
(4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Vinson. 606 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 
1979), ££jJL. itenifid, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); and United States v. 
MUSS, 717 F.2d 1481, 1488 (4th Cir. 1983) interpreting the 
analogous Federal Rules of Evidence)• Accordingly, the trial 
court did not err in failing to hold a pretrial hearing regarding 
the admissibility of the co-conspirator statements. 
Defendant finally urges that the trial court erred by 
failing to specify the reasoning and evidence relied upon in 
making its finding of admissibility. On this point, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Gray merely required the trial court to make the 
finding of admissibility on the record and not that the trial 
court restate the evidence relied upon in its ruling. Gray at 
1319. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurs that a trial 
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court need not pinpoint the evidence relied upon. United States 
v. Cattle King Packing Co.. Inc.. 793 F.2d 232, 242 (10th Cir. 
1986); AQS&JLA united States v. Buchanarw 787 F.2d 477 (loth c i r . 
1986) . As noted e a r l i e r , the prosecution had e s tab l i shed 
s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence to support the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
finding of admissibility. 
POINT II 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
RELEVANT TRANSCRIPTS OF DEFENDANT'S GRAND 
JURY TESTIMONY 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the 
introduction of his grand jury testimony (R. 188-91, 200-05). 
Defendant claimed that he was not notified of his "target" status 
before the grand jury and of his constitutional rights. Id. 
Defendant now asserts these claims on appeal. 
The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
Any person called to testify before the 
grand jury may be advised of his right to be 
represented by counsel. If a witness is or 
becomes a subject of the investigation, he 
shall be advised of that fact and of his 
right to counsel, and of his privilege 
against self-incrimination. On demand of a 
witness for representation by counsel, the 
proceedings shall be delayed until counsel is 
present. In the event that counsel of the 
witness1 choice is not available, he shall be 
required to obtain or accept other counsel. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-11-3(2) (1982). The Utah Supreme Court set 
forth the requirements for target witnesses in State v. Ruggeri, 
19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967). In Ruggeri. the witness was 
not notified of his target status nor the subject matter of the . 
grand jury proceedings. Id. at 972-73. The witness was later 
indicted for perjury in connection with his grand jury testimony. 
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The Supreme Court held as follows: 
It would seem that a witness who is 
unaware that he is a target of a grand jury 
investigation could not intelligently 
determine whether or not he needed counsel 
unless he was fully advised of the charges 
being considered against him; and until he 
has full knowledge regarding that matter, he 
will not know when to assert his 
constitutional claim of privilege against 
self-incrimination. It would also be 
difficult to believe that he could 
intelligently waive the right to counsel 
under such circumstances. 
Id. at 975. 
In the present case, the record is clear that defendant 
was notified of his target status, his right to counsel, and the 
subject matter of the proceedings, all prior to his entry into 
the grand jury room. In response to a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 
defendant appeared outside the grand jury room on April 9, 1986 
(R. 249). Defendant was met by Rodney Snow and Larry Keller, 
grand jury special prosecutors, and Lorin C. Brooks, grand jury 
investigator (R. 537 at p. 1020). Mr. Keller advised defendant 
that he was the subject of the grand jury inquiry. Id. 
Defendant responded that he was unaware of his subject status. 
Id* The prosecutors advised defendant no less than four times 
that he had a right to consult an attorney before his appearance 
and that he may do so. id* Defendant stated that he had an 
attorney, that he was well aware of his rights, and that he knew 
he could stop the proceedings at any point to consult an attorney 
(R. 537 at p. 1023). 
Defendant went on to explain that some police officers 
have a cop mentality to tell the truth in response to grand jury 
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questions only later to find out that charges are brought against 
thera for statements made. !&. Defendant said that he had the 
mentality to realize that he could stop the proceedings and 
consult an attorney if he desired. i£. He stated that he had 
done nothing wrongf that he was willing to proceed without the 
presence of his attorney, and that he wanted to get on with it. 
Id* Again, Mr. Snow emphasized that defendant had a right to an 
attorney and that the hearing could be postponed if defendant so 
desired. Id. 
Defendant was further notified of the subject matter of 
the grand jury inquiry by the Subpeona Duces Tecum, which 
requested "all reports [he] prepared on the Fashion Place Mall 
fire approximately May, 1983" (R. 249). He was also notified in 
person by the special prosecutors (R. 537 at p. 1031) . Defendant 
acknowledged that he understood that his testimony involved 
possible criminal charges regarding tampering with evidence (R. 
537 at p. 1031). 
Applying Ruggeri to the present case. Defendant was 
informed of his target status, the subject of the proceedings, 
and the possible charges contemplated against him. A full 
recitation of the Miranda warning was unnecessary and would have 
been improper. £fi£ In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 79 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Ut. Sup. Ct. filed March 31, 1988); United 
States v. Mandujano. 425 U.S. 564, 580 (1975). Warnings against 
self-incrimination, even in the presence of the grand jury, are 
sufficient to satisfy Fifth Amendment protections. United States 
v. Washington* 431 u.s. 181, 191 (1977). 
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Notablyf defendant does not claim that he did not 
understand his right against compulsory self-incrimination or his 
right to counsel. Defendant merely claims that, under the 
circumstances, he could not waive his rights even if he desired 
to. Defendant's claim ignores the well-established principal 
that a knowing intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights is constitutionally permissible. Johnson 
v. Zerbst> 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Because defendant was properly 
informed of his rights and he claims no coercion, this Court 
should uphold the trial court's finding that defendant's grand 
jury testimony was constitutionally obtained. 
B. STATE'S EXHIBITS 3 0 , 31 AND 32 WERE ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE. 
Defendant asserts that State's Exhibits 30, 31 and 32 
(excerpts of defendant's grand jury testimony) were not offered 
or received in the trial court and thus cannot be considered as 
evidence on appeal. However, the trial court record clearly 
establishes that the exhibits were admitted and thus may be 
considered as evidence on appeal (R. 346). 
C. BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM 
WITH RECORD EVIDENCE, LEGAL ANALYSIS, OR 
LEGAL AUTHORITY, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT 
CONSIDER WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
EXCLUDING HEARSAY STATEMENTS. 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly ruled 
that certain testimony of Mike Christensen was inadmissible 
hearsay. Defendant fails to support his claim. 
The Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 24(a)(9) 
(1987) requires that an appellant's brief "contain the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented 
-27-
and the reasons therefor , with c i t a t i o n s to the a u t h o r i t i e s f 
s t a t u t e s , and parts of the record r e l i e d on.M Defendant f a i l s , 
however, to speci fy in h i s brief which statements were not 
admitted, where the statements appear in the record, and where 
the t r i a l court ruled the statements were inadmiss ib le . Further, 
defendant f a i l s to support h i s claim with any re levant l e g a l 
a n a l y s i s or authority as required by State v. Amicone,, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) . 
Under these circumstances, the Court should assume the 
correctness of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g . State v. S t e g g e l l , 660 
P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983) (correctness of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
judgment i s assumed when counsel on appeal f a i l s to comply with 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7 5 ( p ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( d ) (1977) the rule that preceded R. 
Utah Ct. App. 24(g)(6) (1987) ) ; State v. Tucker. 657 P.2d 755, 
757 (Utah 1982) . In that M t t ]he burden of showing error i s on 
the party who seeks to upset the judgment," State v. Jones . 657 
P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982) , the S ta te should not be put to the 
task of developing defendant's l e g a l arguments by searching 
through the record and making references thereto to support 
defendant's factual a l l e g a t i o n s . Thus, t h i s Court should not 
consider defendant's claim of error in the absence of re levant 
record and authority c i t a t i o n s . 
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D. DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE 
REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
TAMPERING WITH WITNESS STATUTE, AND; JURY 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 39 WAS PROPERLY GIVEN. 
1. Defendant Failed To Challenge The 
Constitutionality Of The Tampering 
With Evidence Statute In The Trial 
Court And Is Thus Precluded From 
Raising The Issue On Appeal. 
Defendant claims that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(1)(b) 
(1978) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. While 
admitting that he failed to specifically reserve the issue below, 
defendant argues that the statute is so plainly unconstitutional 
that it requires review. 
The law is well-established that an appellant may not 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute for the first time 
on appeal. State v. Laird. 601 P.2d 926, 927 (Utah 1979). 
Further, because the statute is not plainly unconstitutional, the 
trial court's failure to raise the issue sua sponte was not 
error, I&. at n.6; State v. Carlsen. 638 P.2d 512 (Utah 1981), 
£££!• d£Hi£Jif 455 U.S. 958 (1982) (holding that Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-8-508(1)(d) is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad)• 
Defendant argues that his objection to Jury Instruction 
Number 39 remotely preserves the issue of statutory 
constitutionality (R. 532 at p. 1428). However, defendant's 
objection at trial was that his proposed instruction was simply 
more proper. JjJ.. Thus, his objection could not have put the 
trial court on notice that defendant was challenging the 
constitutionally of the statute. Id. Accordingly, this Court 
should refrain from considering the merits of defendant's belated 
challenge. 
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2. Jury Instruction Number 39 did 
not relieve the State of its 
burden of proof* 
Defendant asserts that Jury Instruction Number 39 
effectively relieved the State of its burden of proof. 
Specificallyr defendant contends that the instruction does not 
require the jury to find that the acts of tampering relate to 
defendant's knowledge of a pending investigation or official 
proceeding. Defendant's claim is clearly meritless. 
At trial, the Court instructed the jury that: 
In order to convict the defendant Ralph 
Tolman, of the crime of Tampering With a 
Witness, as alleged in Count IV of the 
Indictment, you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1. That the defendant, Ralph Tolraan, 
believed that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending or about to be 
instituted; 
2. That the defendant knowingly or 
intentionally attempted to induce or 
otherwise cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold 
Ralph Tolman1s seven-page investigative 
report of August 1, 1983, regarding the 
May 1, 1983, Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza fire; and 
3. That the offense occurred on or 
about and between August 1, 1983, and 
August 31, 1983, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
If you believe that the evidence 
establishes each of the foregoing elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to 
find the defendant, Ralph Tolman, guilty of 
Tampering With a Witness. On the other hand, 
if the evidence has failed to so establish 
one or more of the said elements, then it is 
your duty to find the defendant not guilty. 
(R. 416) (emphasis added). 
-30-
As shown above, the ins t ruc t ion r e l a t e s defendant 's act 
of inducing a person (C. Dean Larsen) to withhold a document or 
thing (defendant 's seven-page inves t iga t ive report) from 
to the o f f i c i a l inves t iga t ion . The finding of the jury 
tha t defendant attempted to induce a person to withhold an 
inves t iga t ive repor t i s su f f i c i en t to r e l a t e defendant 's act to 
the o f f i c i a l inves t iga t ion or proceeding. Thus, the t r i a l court 
did not err in giving Ins t ruc t ion Number 39. 
POINT I I I 
NO PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT RESULTING IN 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT BELOW. 
A. DEFENDANT FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM 
THAT HE WAS SINGLED OUT AMONG GRAND JURY 
"TARGET14 WITNESSES TO BE DENIED NOTICE 
AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Defendant argues that he was the only grand jury 
"target" witness who did not receive advance notice of his target 
status, was denied the right to have counsel present, and was not 
informed of the nature of the prospective charges. Noticeably, 
defendant fails to support his argument with any record evidence, 
legal authority, or legal analysis as required by the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 24(a)(9) (1987). Accordingly, 
this Court should not consider defendant's claim, State v. 
MiSfiJlfif 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); S t a t e v . S t e a a e l l , 660 
P^2d 252 , 253 (Utah 1983) ; S t a t e v . Tucker . 657 P.2d 755 , 757 
(Utah 1982) . 
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B. THE PROSECUTORS1 ALLEGED CONCEALMENT 
OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE. 
Defendant asserts that the special prosecutors 
concealed potentially exculpatory evidence consisting of 
transcripts of the grand jury testimony of Mike Christensen, 
Shauna Clark, and Jim Burns. However, defendant admits in his 
brief that the above witnesses testified on defendant's behalf at 
trial and that he was supplied copies of their grand jury 
testimony. Under such circumstances, prejudicial error could not 
have occurred and, in fact, defendant does not claim any 
prejudice. In the absence of prejudicial error, this Court 
should find no reversible prosecutorial misconduct occurred. 
State v. Tucker. 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985). 
C. BECAUSE DEFENDANT RELIES ON MATTERS 
OUTSIDE THE RECORD, THIS COURT SHOULD 
NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT 
THE PROSECUTOR ATTEMPTED TO PREVENT 
DEFENSE WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING. 
Defendant claims that special prosecutor, Larry Keller, 
spoke to witness Shauna Clark prior to trial and attempted to 
influence Ms. Clark not to testify. (Appellant's Brief at pp. 
32-33). Defendant's claim is unsupported by the record. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Bingham, 6 84 
P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984), that an appellate court cannot rule on 
matters outside the trial court record. This rule clearly 
applies to the present case where defendant bases his argument on 
an extra-judicial conversation which took place in the courtroom 
foyer and which appears nowhere in the record. Therefore, in the 
absence of record evidence, this Court should assume the 
correctness of the trial court's ruling that no prosecutorial 
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misconduct occurred. £££ State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252, 253 
(Utah 1983). 
Defendant appears to further argue that the trial court 
improperly ruled that certain defense witnesses could not testify 
regarding hearsay statements of defendant. Againr defendant 
fails to support his argument with any record evidence, legal 
authority, or legal analysis. Defendant simply argues that the 
hearsay rule is not so mysterious as to require protracted 
discussion and concludes that prosecutor misconduct occurred by 
frivolous invocation of the Rules of Evidence. In light of 
defendant's unsupported arguments, this Court should not 
entertain defendant's claim of error. Id. 
D. THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S PROSPECTIVE RIGHT TO 
TESTIFY WAS HARMLESS SINCE DEFENDANT 
TESTIFIED AT TRIAL. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment that 
defendant "is going to testify" prejudiced his privilege not to 
testify. Although the prosecutor's comment may have been 
improper, it could not have constituted prejudicial error. 
At trial, defense counsel attempted to elicit from 
witness Mike Christiensen statements of defendant made at or 
about the time of the crime (R. 531 at p. 1203-1206). Prosecutor 
Keller objected to the admission of the statements on hearsay 
grounds. Id. The discussion concerning the objection continued 
as follows: 
MR. DeLAND: He's talking about his state of 
mind. He's not — it's not what Mike 
believes his state of mind to be, it's what 
he is stating his state of mind to be, why 
he's angry. 
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MR. KELLER: Your Honor, I understand Mr. 
Tolman i s going to t e s t i f y . He ce r ta in ly can 
t e l l us a l l about i t himself. I t doesn ' t 
need to come in through t h i s wi tness . I t ' s 
object ionable hearsay. 
THE COURT: Jus t based on what was 
represented to the Court, we do have the 
declarant here and the declarant can t e s t i f y 
as to what h i s s t a t e of mind was. 
I would l i k e to remind Mr. Keller 
t ha t the declarant i s thus far not ava i l ab le . 
He has a cons t i t u t iona l r ight not to t e s t i f y f 
and if tha t i s the bas is we're going to hear 
from him anyway, I think t h a t ' s 
object ionable . I don ' t think t h a t ' s a good 
object ion. 
MR. KELLER: Submit i t , your Honor. 
THE COURT: I guess if the declarant is not 
ava i l ab l e , then he can do i t . But if he ' s 
avai lable^ I am not sure what he ' s going to 
do. If he does take the stand, then i t 
wouldn't be — if he doesn ' t take the stand, 
maybe you can r e c a l l him. 
MR. DeLAND: Well, he i s n ' t on the stand ye t 
and i t ' s Friday. 
MR. SNOW: I thought you might object if we 
cal led him. 
MR. DeLAND: Has the Court ruled? 
THE COURT: I am thinking here . On the horns 
of a dilemma. We'll overrule the objection 
and you may t e s t i f y . 
(R. 531 at pp. 1205-06) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part t e s t for 
determining whether a prosecutor's remark warrants r e v e r s a l : 
*(1) did the remarks ca l l to the attention of the jurors matters 
which they could not properly consider in determining their 
verdict , and (2) were the j u ro r s under the circumstances of the 
pa r t i cu l a r case probably influenced by those remarks." Sta te Vt 
- 3 4 -
lUCXfiXr 727 P.2d 185, 187 (Utah 1986) . Under Rule 30 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[alny error , de f ec t , i rregu lar i ty 
or variance which does not a f f e c t the substant ia l r ight s of a 
party sha l l be d i sregarded . - Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30(a) 
(1982) . 
In State v. Tucker. 709 P.2d 313, 316 (1985) , the Utah 
Supreme Court in a s imilar case to be present held that a 
prosecutor 's comment was not p r e j u d i c i a l . In Tucker, the 
prosecutor in c los ing argument inferred that defense counsel did 
not explain the defendant's attempt to conceal himself while in 
c lose proximity to the crime. i$l. Defense counsel quickly 
objected and the judge admonished the jury that the defendant did 
not have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of proving h i s innocence. isL. The 
Supreme Court held that the prosecutorial misconduct was not 
pre judic ia l error because i t was not r e p e t i t i v e or i n t e n t i o n a l , 
the t r i a l court quickly and d e c i s i v e l y obviated the harm through 
admonishment to the jury, and that there was no reasonable 
l i k e l i h o o d of a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t in the absence of the comment. 
i d . 
As in Tucker. the prosecutor 's comment in the present 
case was not i n t e n t i o n a l , r e p e t i t i v e , or l i k e l y to produce 
prejudice in the jurors ' minds regarding defendant's r ight not to 
t e s t i f y . Further, the t r i a l court admonished the prosecutor, in 
the presence of the jury , that the defendant has a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r ight not to t e s t i f y (R. 531 at pp. 1205-06) . The t r i a l cour t ' s 
admonishment e f f e c t i v e l y cured any harm resu l t ing from the 
prosecutor 's comment. See State v. Hales . 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 
(Utah 1982); S tate v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) . 
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F u r t h e r , any harm r e s u l t i n g from the p r o s e c u t o r s 
comment was e f f e c t i v e l y removed when the defendant took the 
stand* The Kansas Supreme Court , under i d e n t i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
he ld t h a t "the d e f e n d a n t , by tak ing the s t a n d , e f f e c t i v e l y 
removed any p o s s i b l e p r e j u d i c e from the minds of the j u r o r s . " 
S t a t e v . P u r s l e y , 238 Kan 2 5 3 , 710 P.2d 1 2 3 1 , 1240 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . In 
the absence of a r e a s o n a b l e l i k e l i h o o d of a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t , the 
harm, i f any , must be c o n s i d e r e d h a r m l e s s . S t a t e v . Tucker , 709 
P.2d 3 1 3 , 316 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) . 
Defendant f u r t h e r argues t h a t he was compel led t o 
t e s t i f y due t o the p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment. D e f e n d a n t ' s argument i s 
m e r i t l e s s . F i r s t , de fendant f a i l s t o show any p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t 
on the jury as a consequence of h i s t e s t i f y i n g . S e c o n d l y , a 
c u r a t i v e i n s t r u c t i o n t o the jury would have been s u f f i c i e n t t o 
remove any t a i n t i n the event defendant chose not t o t e s t i f y . 
See S t a t e v . Hales* 652 P.2d 1 2 9 0 , 1292 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . Thus, no 
p r e j u d i c i a l error can be a t t r i b u t e d t o the p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment. 
E. NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRING 
REVERSAL EXISTS. 
1 . Because The A l l e g e d N o n - d i s c l o s e d 
Excu lpatory Wi tnes s Testimony Was 
Admitted At T r i a l , And Because Defendant 
Only S p e c u l a t e s That There May Be 
A d d i t i o n a l N o n - d i s c l o s e d Excu lpatory 
E v i d e n c e , Defendant F a i l s To Show P r e j u d i c e . 
Defendant compla ins t h a t the p r o s e c u t i o n f a i l e d t o 
d i s c l o s e t r a n s c r i p t s of grand jury t e s t i m o n y which was p e r c e i v e d 
by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l as e x c u l p a t o r y * He f u r t h e r compla ins t h a t 
t h e r e may be a d d i t i o n a l e x c u l p a t o r y e v i d e n c e which was no t 
d i s c l o s e d by the p r o s e c u t i o n . D e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m must f a i l for 
l a c k of p r e j u d i c e . 
- 3 6 -
Prior to trial* the court ordered the prosecution to 
supply defendant with copies of grand jury transcripts pertaining 
to the case (R. 117). During trialf it was discovered that there 
were additional transcripts not disclosed by the prosecutor which 
defense counsel believed were exculpatory (R. 537 at pp. 1037-
38). Notably, defendant admits in his brief that he had the 
opportunity to call the alleged nondisclosed witnesses at trial. 
Under these facts, defendant is bankrupt to claim that 
he was prejudiced in any way by the alleged nondisclosure. In 
fact, defendant fails to allege on appeal any prejudicial harm 
which was not alleviated by the full disclosure at trial. 
Accordingly, defendant's claim cannot be considered reversible 
error. See Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30(a) (1982). 
Defendant additionally complains that since there were 
three allegedly non-disclosed witnesses, there may be further 
undisclosed evidence. Defendant's argument is purely 
speculative. Speculative and unknown discovery violations cannot 
be grounds for reversible error. 
2. Defendant Fails To Support His Claim 
Of Cumulative Error. 
Defendant argues that the alleged misconduct, taken as 
a whole, constitutes cumulative error sufficient to justify 
reversal. Defendant merely recites, in summary, his previous 
arguments and concludes that enough error must exist to require 
reversal. 
Again, defendant claims error without the support of 
legal analysis or authority. Accordingly, this Court should not 
consider defendant's unsupported claims. State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT. 
Defendant claims that the jury was exposed to an 
improper outside influence by the fact that some members of the 
jury engaged in prayer. He further claims that at least two 
jurors were pressured to vote for conviction as a result of the 
entrenched position of other jurors and a misunderstanding of the 
hung jury instruction* Defendant's claims are erroneous. 
Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence1 renders the 
testimony and affidavits of members of the jury inadmissible for 
the purpose of impeaching the jury verdict unless they are 
introduced to show that extraneous matters were improperly 
considered during jury deliberation. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that: 
evidence by a f f i d a v i t or testimony of a juror 
w i l l not be received to impeach or quest ion 
Rule 606(b) Utah R. Evid. reads as f o l l o w s : 
Inquiry in to v a l i d i t y of v e r d i c t or 
indictment. Upon an inquiry into the 
v a l i d i t y of a verd ic t or indictment, a juror 
may not t e s t i f y as to any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the j u r y ' s 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s or to the e f f e c t of anything 
upon h i s or any other j u r o r ' s mind or 
emotions as inf luencing him to assent to or 
d i s s e n t from the v e r d i c t or indictment or 
concerning h i s mental processes in connection 
therewith/ except that a juror may t e s t i f y on 
the quest ion whether extraneous pre jud ic ia l 
information was improperly brought to the 
j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n or whether any outs ide 
inf luence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror . Nor may h i s a f f i d a v i t or evidence 
of any statement by him concerning a matter 
about which he would be precluded from 
t e s t i f y i n g be rece ived for these purposes. 
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the jury verdict or to show the grounds upon 
which it was tendered, or to show their 
misunderstanding of fact or law, or that they 
misunderstood the charge of the court, or the 
effect of their verdict, or their opinions, 
surmises and processes of reasoning in 
arriving at a verdict. 
State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (1972).2 Thus, 
defendant's attempt to impeach the jury's verdict was 
impermissible without a showing of extraneous prejudicial 
information or outside influence. 
Defendant further argues that the jury members were 
exposed to an "outside influence,1; namely, God. Interestingly, 
for this Court to consider defendant's claim of "outside 
influence' would be to judicially determine the existence of 
God—a theological question clearly proscribed by the Utah 
Supreme Court. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Utah 
1988) . Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
held that "prayer and supposed responses to prayer are not 
included within the meaning of the words 'outside influence. 
State v. DeMille, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 (Ut. Sup. Ct. filed May 
26, 1988). Accordingly, the Court ruled that Rule 606(b) 
precluded a defendant's attempt to claim that a juror was adverse 
affected by his or her religious convictions. Id. at 8. 
Therefore, defendant's claim that the trial court erred in 
refusing to admit the juror affidavits is erroneous. 
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence notes that Rule 606(b) is verbatim the federal rule and 
comports with former Rule 41 and 44, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), and Utah case law, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 
662 (1972). 
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Likewise, defendant's attempt to impeach the verdict 
due to a juror's misunderstanding of the Mhung jury" instruction 
is similarly erroneous. As noted earlier, the Utah Supreme Court 
has clearly held that it is improper for impeachment purposes to 
allege juror misunderstanding of fact or law. State v. Gee, 28 
Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (1972). It is further improper 
to expose the inner pressures inherent in jury deliberations. 
1&. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the testimony and 
affidavits were inadmissible to impeach the jury verdict and 
properly denied defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
Defendant also claims that misconduct occurred when the 
court allowed the jury to receive a dictionary during 
deliberations. This Court has ruled that a dictionary is 
"extraneous information" for purposes of impeachment under Rule 
606(b) Utah Rules of Evidence. Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 
305 (Utah App. 1987). However, defendant cites no record 
evidence in support of his factual allegation that a dictionary 
was present in the jury room. State v. Bingham. 684 P.2d 43, 46 
(Utah 1984) ("This court cannot rule on matters outside the trial 
record.")• Neither does defendant establish by juror affidavit 
or other record evidence whether the dictionary was actually used 
or in what manner it was used. Rather, defendant simply infers 
that silence is prejudice. In the absence of record evidence to 
the contrary, this Court should assume the correctness of the 
judgment below. State v. Tucker. 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah 1982). 
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POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS. 
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient 
evidence presented at trial to support his conviction* A review 
of the evidence, however, reveals that defendant's claim is 
without merit. 
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in State v. Booker* 
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that where a defendant claims the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the standard 
of review is narrow. 
*[W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State 
v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983); 
accgrd State vt MgCardellr Utah, 652 p.2d 
942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the 
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. "It is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses. . . .*! State Vt Laromr Utah, 606 
p.2d 229, 231 (1980); agg<?rd State Vt Ljndenr 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. . . . 
Id. at 345 (emphasis in original)• 
Defendant was convicted of the offenses of Tampering 
with Witness and Official Misconduct which provide as follows: 
Tampering with witness—Retaliation 
against witness or informant—Bribery—A 
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person is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or 
otherwise cause a person to: 
• • • 
(b) Withhold any t e s t i m o n y , 
i n f o r m a t i o n , document or t h i n g . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 7 6 - 8 - 5 0 8 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . 
Official misconduct—Unauthorized acts or 
failure of duty—A public servant is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor if, with an intent 
to benefit himself or another or to harm 
another, he knowingly commits an unauthorized 
act which purports to be an act of his 
office, or knowingly refrains from performing 
a duty imposed on him by law or clearly 
inherent in the nature of his office. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-201 (1978). 
Thus, the elements of Tampering With a Witness are that 
a person, (1) believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, (2) he 
knowingly or intentionally attempts to induce or otherwise cause 
a person, (3) to withhold any testimony information, document, or 
thing. Further, the elements of Official Misconduct are that (1) 
a public servant, (2) with an intent to benefit himself or 
another or to harm another, (3) knowingly commits an unauthorized 
act which purports to be an act of his office, or (4) knowingly 
refrains from performing a duty imposed on him by law or clearly 
inherent in the nature of his office. 
A review of the evidence reveals that sworn testimony 
and documentary evidence was offered at triad to establish each 
and every element of the offenses for which defendant was 
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convicted. Defendant himself t e s t i f i e d tha t he and Olin Yearby 
conducted an o f f i c i a l inves t iga t ion as inves t iga to rs for the Sal t 
Lake County At torney 's Office in to the cause and or ig in of the 
Fashion Place Professional Plaza f i r e (R. 532 a t 1233). As a 
r e s u l t of the inves t iga t ion , defendant prepared a seven-page 
repor t s e t t i ng forth the inves t iga t ive action taken, the 
information obtained, and the suspected or ig in of the f i r e (R. 
532 at p . 1242) ( S t a t e ' s Exhibit 8) . Defendant submitted the 
or ig ina l report to Harraan for approval and gave a courtesy copy 
to Dean Larsen, Murray City Fire Marshall (R. 259 at p . 137; R. 
532 at p. 1254) • After reviewing the repor t , Harman cal led 
defendant in to h is office and ordered defendant to wri te a 
s u b s t i t u t e repor t (R. 529 at pp. 146-47) 
At t r i a l and before the grand jury , defendant t e s t i f i e d 
tha t Harraan re jected the seven-page repor t because i t made the 
county -look bad" and " l i ab l e" (R. 530 at p . 44, R. 532 a t 1246). 
Harman wanted a more concise "shor t , " "one-page" repor t without a 
conclusion and which simply referred to Ashby's favorable repor t 
(R. 532 at p. 1246) . 
Soon the rea f t e r , defendant telephoned Larsen and told 
him tha t Harman was angry about the content of the r epo r t , was 
concerned tha t i t could cost the county mil l ions of d o l l a r s , and 
wanted the report destroyed (R. 535 at p. 91, R. 532 a t p . 1256). 
Defendant told Larsen to "dest roy," "get r id of," "paper the 
walls with," "eat," and "deep s ix ," the r epor t . Id. Defendant 
explained that Harman believed defendant and Larsen to be too 
close of friends and that defendant wrote the repor t to bols ter 
Larsen ' s theory of the f i re (R. 535 p. 919). 
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On August 25 , 1983, defendant submitted a one-page 
report excluding any opinions as to the f i r e or ig in and simply 
referr ing to Ashby's report ( S t a t e ' s Exhibit 7) (See Appendix 
"B"). The report was quickly approved, signed by Harman, and 
placed in the County Attorney's master f i l e , thus c los ing the 
case (R. 536 at pp. 752-53) . 
About November of 1985, defendant spoke with John 
Harrington, a reporter for Channel Four News, and to ld Harrington 
that Harman had ordered the report to be "shit canned," "deep 
s ixed ," or "shredded - because i t made the County look bad (R. 530 
at pp. 1 4 , 16 , 19 and 2 9 ) . Defendant to ld Harrington that Harman 
ordered him to commit a fe lony (R. 530 at p . 1 7 ) . Defendant said 
that he had never done anything dishonest before in h i s l i f e and 
that he f e l t he had sold out to Harman and the other crooks in 
the County Attorney's Office (R. 530 at p. 2 1 ) . 
Based upon the foregoing evidence, a jury could have 
reasonably concluded that defendant, be l i ev ing that an o f f i c i a l 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n or proceeding was pending or about to be 
i n s t i t u t e d , knowingly and i n t e n t i o n a l l y attempted to induce Dean 
Larsen to withhold defendant's seven-page i n v e s t i g a t i v e report . 
The jury could have further found that defendant, as a publ ic 
servant , intended to bene f i t himself or another or to harm 
another, when he knowingly committed an unauthorized act which 
purported to be an act of h i s o f f i c e by attempting to induce Dean 
Larsen to withhold the seven-page report . Thus, the evidence was 
s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h the r e q u i s i t e elements of the o f f ense . 
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Defendant appears to further argue that the evidence 
was insufficient because some evidence, if believed, tends to 
show that defendant did not commit the offenses. In making his 
argument, defendant ignores the fundamental principle that a 
jury's belief or disbelief of a defendant's theory of a crime is 
a matter within the jury's exclusive prerogative to weigh the 
credibility of the witness testimony. State v. Lamm* 606 P.2d 
229 (Utah 1980); EFCO Distributing. Inc.. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 
375, 412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966). The basic function of the jury is 
to weigh the conflicting evidence and draw conclusions therefrom. 
State v. Pierce. 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986). Despite testimony to 
the contrary, the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that defendant committed the offenses of which he was 
convicted State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL ON A 
THEORY OF CUMULATIVE ERROR. 
Defendant requests that this Court reverse his 
convictions on the basis of either individually prejudicial or 
cumulative error. Based on the foregoing discussion of 
defendant's allegations of error, reversal of his conviction is 
not warranted on the basis of any individual error or on a theory 
of cumulative error. Because the trial court, at most, committed 
harmless error, defendant's convictions should be affirmed, gee 
State v. Bishop. 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 38 (Utah Sup. Ct., filed 
February 3, 1988); Hawkes v. State. 644 P.2d 111, 113 (Okl. Cr. 
1982); state v, MgKenzie, 608 p.2d 428, 448, £&L±. danifid, 449 
U.S. 1050 (1980); United States v. Bohr. 581 F.2d 1294, 1304 (8th 
Cir. 1978), ££!£. denied, 439 U.S. 958. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argumentsf Respondent 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm defendants 
convictions. 
DATED this /J?0" day of Junef 1988, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General' 
,i.^a 
DAN R. LARS EN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Loni F. DeLand and Scott W. Reed, attorneys for appellant, 132 
, this South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
June, 1988. 
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EXHIBITS 
EXHIBIT A 
Supplementary Report 
Salt Lake County Attorneys Office 
Criminal Division 
FFENSE AS REPORTED 
lurray F i re Assist 
CODE VIOLATION 
[>MPLAINANT 
lurray F i re Dept. 
DATE REPORTED DATE OCCURRED 
ADDRESS 
CASE NUMBER 
83250 
RESIDENCE PHONE 
OUTSIDE AGENCY & CASE NUMBER 
BUSINESS PHONE 
DDlTlONAL INFORMATION * SYNOPSIS 
AUGUST 1, 1983 
Case: Assist in Salt Lake County Mental Health 
Fire, located at Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza 6065 South 300 East, Murray, Utah 84107. 
Date of fire: Sunday, May 1, 1983 at 0454 hours 
Murray Fire Department received the first report of 
fire at 0454 hours. The first responding engine came from Station 
#2, which is located on 6100 South just West of State Street. It 
came up 6100 South to 3rd East and went North to the Southside of 
the building. The first staging was on the Southside of the building 
and inch and a half preconnecting lines were broke out and fire 
fighters entered into the 2nd floor. The fire fighters crawled 
into the building and all they could find was smoke, not alot of 
super heated area. They backed out and went downstairs, broke out 
glass doors and found the same as listed above. 
Fire fighters came back out and tried to find the 
flames. The building was laddered, the roof was soft and spungy. 
The second engine arrived from Station #1, staged on Southside 
of building. Third engine arrived and staged on the Northside of 
building. Here was observed a lot of heavy smoke drifting North. 
The wind was from the South traveling 6 to 9 miles per hour on that 
EXHIBIT 
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INVESTIGATORS SIGNATURE OATE APPROVED BY 
Sgt. Ralph Tolman 8-1-83 typed by jb 
Case 83250 
particular morning. The majority of smoke was omitting from the 
eaves on the structure, directly above DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S 
office, East of the West entrance of the building on the Northside. 
This is the primary entrance into the 2nd floor of the Salt Lake 
Mental Health area. 
At this point, a fourth alarm was called in, and 
Midvale Fire Department arrived. They attacked the fire from the 
Westside of the building, adjacent to 300 East. The fire had broke> 
through and was coming out the Westside area by the time of arrival 
of Midvale Fire Department. At approximately this same time, entrance 
was made by Murray Fire fighters into the West door on the North side, 
which makes entry directly into the Salt Lake County Mental Health 
area. Fire fighter SHANE STRATEN, knocked out a door and entry was 
made into the hallway. STRATEN could feel heat and see fire to his 
immediate left as he faced South. This is the hallway that runs 
inbetween DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S office and EDITH JAVENS office. 
Heat was too intense at this point, and fire fighter STRATEN retreated 
from the building. Also, the roof was getting very spongy which 
created danger to fire fighers to be inside, and fire fighters that 
had been on the roof were also advised to retreat off the roof. 
The first water into the building on the Northside by 
Murray Fire, went through the window of DR. JOEL COLBKRTSON'S office. 
Then as the roof collapsed, water was put over the walls into the 
main-stay area of the fire. This was the area of DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S 
office, running directly South of EDITH JAVENS and DONNA LARSEN'S 
office. (See hand drawn diagram attached to report. This was the cent* 
of area of fire.) 
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The roof collapsed and copious amounts of water 
was poured into the center of fire. It was determined at this 
point, that this particular area was totally damaged and not 
recoverable and/or saveable. Firefighters then moved their 
primary effort to East and West areas of the building, to try 
and contain and save remainder. As fire fighting efforts were 
directed towards the East and West end of the building, the area 
directly South and West of DONNA LARSEN'S office, which belongs 
to a DR. SMITH, Dentist, a Nitro/dioxyide container approximately 
10 inches in diameter and 4 feet high, exited the building straight 
up in the air, approximately two or three hundred feet, landing 
North of the building in the parking lot approximately 300 feet 
from the building. In the same proximity of DR. SMITH'S office, 
where the Nitro/dioxyide was located, were two containers of pure 
oxygen of the same dimensions, which created massive additional 
fire load. This is a primary reason for additional extensive 
damages in this particular area. 
The false ceiling directly above EDITH JAVEN'S office 
area, are the roof joists running East and West through the length 
of the building, adjacent to these joists were the ridged conduit 
electrical lines and natural gas pipe lines. When the roof collapsed 
and the air conditioning unit, which was on the roof, (dimensions 
approximately 4 x 6 x 4 feet) fell through the roof into EDITH 
JAVEN'S office. The natural gas lines were fractured and broken 
and bent down into the area, adding to fire load to this particular 
area. Unknown when natural gas to the entire building was shut off. 
Shortly after the central roof collapsed, this area was 
abandoned to free burn. The fire continued to burn in this area, 
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and unhampered for approximately one (1) hour, while fire fighting 
efforts were directed towards the East and West ends of the 
building. 
On May 2, 1983 the day following the fire, this 
Investigator and SGT. OLIN YEARBY, from the County Attorney's 
Office, arrived to assist Assistant Fire Chief, Fire Marshall DEAN 
LARSON, in ascertaining the cause of the fire. Our attention was 
directed towards a space heater and extention cord in MR. JOEL 
COLBERTSON'S office. 
The following is a list of items sent to A.I.D. 
CONSULTING ENGINEERING INCORPORATED, 10830 Composit Drive, Dallas 
Texas 75220. Area code 214 350-8781. These items were sent for 
expert examination by a J.L. GILMORE, employed by the above firm, to 
ascertain if space heater was the cause of fire. The following 
items were sent: 
1. A non-fire damaged electric space heater, the same 
brand and type as damaged. 
2. Fire damaged space heater. 
3. Small burned electrical extention cord. 
4. Electrical receptical. 
5. 2nd piece of small electrical parallel lamp cord, 
apparently either serving as a lamp or some unknown appliance. . 
The above items were sent on May 17, 1983 by myself and 
Chief DEAN LARSON. 
MR. J.L. GILMORE'S conclusion was as follows: 
"Based on our examination, we have found no related 
evidence that would indicate the existence of an electrical fault 
or arking condition on any of the electrical appliances or cords 
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submitted. Further, we have found no evidence that would support the 
contention that the electrical heater, clock radio or lamp was 
electrically energized at the time of the fire. The small 
extention cord allegedly supplying a electrical power to a lamp, 
space heater and clock radio, is being used in environment some 
25 to 307« beyond it's rated capacity. This could lead to an over 
temperature condition resulting damage to the installation and 
ultimately a fire. However, microscopic examination of the stranded 
conductors, reveals no evidence that this extention cord was 
electrically energized at the time of the fire.M 
This Agent was removed from the investigation of the 
fire approximately one week after being assigned. Consequently 
an extensive and full investigation was never consumated by this 
Agent. This Agent's conclusions after approximately 5 days and 
several on-scene walk throughs, and dig down of the area, of 
DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S office are as follows: 
The fire originated in the area of JOEL COLBERTSON'S 
office. Particularly the Southwest corner. Reasons: #1. The 
intensive low heat (floor level) on brick wall and V pattern on 
brick wall, goes directly down to area of metal file cabinet, 
approximately 18 inches square. Also the V pattern on the file 
cabinet, directs it to the floor area. #2. The desk which was located 
on the Northwest corner against the wall, was totally consumed. The 
only recognizeable remainder being approximately 1 to 1 1/2 inches 
of the bottom of the legs of the desk. My conception is that the fire 
originated in Southwest corner, crept up wall, consumed the bookcase 
above the metal file cabinet, fell down into this area and continued 
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climbing the West wall to obtain the air to the East, where the 
entry door was located and opened. Along West wall fire continued 
up and East, adjacent to this West wall was a hide-a-way bed. The 
springs were totally annealed on the couch. All items on West 
end of office were totally consumed and eventually the fire climbing 
the wall, burning the metal grids holding the tile roof covering the 
false ceiling. This area becoming super heated, to the point where 
metal structures failed, tiles fell as one piece to the floor area. 
Consequently, the carpet not destroyed until you get into the door 
entry area. The fire rating on the tile is one hour when clipped, 
on undipped tile the fire rating would be less. Clipping meaning, 
stays hooking tile to metal structure. They were not in place in 
this particular structure. The fire burned into the false ceiling area 
and rapidly spread throughout the building. It appears that fire 
drafts were not constant and in continuality with walls in false 
ceiling area, allowing fire to virtually move at will to where it 
could find air and fuel load. 
The area that was EDITH JAVEN'S and DONNA LARSON'S 
office space, was somewhat more burned than JOEL COLBERTSON'S office. 
The reasons for this are: The fire was allowed to burn freely for at 
least one hour in JAVENS & LARSON'S and DR. SMITH'S area. JOEL 
COLBERTSON'S office was almost as badly burned, but as stated before, 
the first water into building went through JOEL COLBERTSON'S window and 
had to have had a hampering affect, slowing burning down here. 
Consequently, this Agent feels that DR. COLBERTSON'S office may have 
been virtually burned out prior to water entering, and/or fire 
departments arrival. The V pattern on entire building structure 
itself, was directly over JOEL COLBERTSON'S office, meaning DR. 
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COLBERTSON'S office sustained substantial heat for a larger 
period of time. The only place the fire actually broke through the 
eaves themselves, was where DR. COLBERTSON'S office West wall 
adjoins to the outside North wall of structure. 
This Agent consequently places the origin in the 
Southwest corner, JOEL COLBERTSON'S office, cause unknown. 
Attached to report are the Murray City Fire Department 
incident reports. 
EXHIBIT B 
Supplementary Report 
Salt Lake County Attorneys Office 
Criminal Division 
OFFENSE AS REPORTED 
Fire 
CODE VIOLATION 
COMPLAINANT 
DATE REPORTED DATE OCCURRED 
ADDRESS 
CASE NUMBER 
83250 
RESIDENCE PHONE 
OUTSIDE AGENCY 6 CASE NUMBER 
BUSINESS PHONE 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION & SYNOPSIS 
AUGUST 25, 1983 
Case: Assist in Salt Lake County Mental Health Fire 
Fashion Place Professional Plaza 
6065 South 300 East, Murray, Utah 84107 
Date of fire: Sunday, May 1, 1983 at 0452 hours. 
This Investigator arrived to assist Murray Fire on 
Monday, May 2, 1983. I assisted in the process of digging thru 
DR. COLBERTSON'S office that day. 
On May 4th, an outside Investigator was hired by 
\ 
Salt Lake County. It was at this time that I was removed from 
the case to prevent duplication of investigative efforts. 
No further action. 
